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obvious as the country’s inflation outstrips that of its
trading partners, the demand for foreign (domestic)
currencies rises (falls), and the country’s foreign
exchange reserves disappear.
Thus, a persistently fixed exchange rate lends
credibility to a government’s commitment to a stable
monetary policy. Such credibility is important. Even
if a government is firmly committed to a stable
monetary policy, private-sector behavior can nullify
the expected benefits of such a policy if the private
sector does not believe the policy will last.
But there is a problem with using a fixed
exchange rate to signal such credibility. A govern-
ment’s commitment to fixing the exchange rate may,
itself, be incredible. Almost any government faces
temptations to renege on both exchange rate and
monetary policy targets. If the returns from unex-
pectedly devaluing are high, a fixed exchange rate
is not very credible. For a government to make a
fixed exchange rate credible, it must demonstrate
or create circumstances that make the cost of
devaluation high.
This article assays the policy and economic
characteristics that could make fixed exchange
rate regimes credible and, therefore, make credible
a government’s commitment to monetary stability.
T
he major Latin American countries have em-
barked on broad-based economic reform
programs to raise economic efficiency, promote
investment, and accelerate output growth.1 To
achieve these goals, these countries are attempting
to foster economic stability, and in some cases,
the tool they are using is an exchange rate fixed
to the U.S. dollar.
When establishing economic stability is an
important goal, the purposes fixed exchange rates
can serve go beyond what is immediately obvious.
Not only do fixed exchange rates stabilize the
domestic prices at which exporters can sell and
importers can import, a fixed exchange rate regime
also has important implications for domestic
monetary and price stability.
Implications for domestic monetary and price
stability involve international differences in inflation
rates. For a country’s exchange rate to remain fixed,
a country’s inflation rate and the inflation rates of
its trading partners must be the same. If the country’s
inflation rate persistently exceeds those of its trading
partners, the country’s citizens will buy foreign
products. After all, prices of domestic products in
a country with a fixed exchange rate will eventually
rise above prices of foreign imports. The same price
phenomenon will hurt the country’s exports. Money
growth is a primary cause of inflation; therefore,
a country that fixes the price of its currency rela-
tive to some other country’s currency implicitly
must follow that country’s monetary policy.
As a result, a fixed exchange rate can signal
to investors a government’s intent to follow a
stable monetary policy. If the government prints
money to cover budget deficits or to postpone
unpleasant adjustments to adverse external shocks,
investors will notice quickly. The policy will be
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1 Examples include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
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The factors that result in such credibility—or in a
lack of credibility—are complicated because the
benefits of reneging are not always what one
might expect. The obvious gain that would make
reneging likely—that a devaluation could result in
economic growth—is not the only benefit. Even
when a devaluation clearly will not result in rising
income and growing government revenues, some
countries still devalue, and we outline what gov-
ernments get when they do. Some governments,
for example, are simply trying to accumulate
foreign exchange so that they can defend their
currencies in the future.
In the next section of this article, we use a
simple game to examine the dilemma Latin Ameri-
can governments face when choosing whether to
fix their exchange rate. We then consider the impor-
tance of the effects of devaluation on output growth
and discuss key economic relationships that deter-
mine the effects of changes in exchange rates.
The credibility of exchange rate
and anti-inflation policy
Although we know that official promises to
follow a monetary or exchange rate rule are not
credible if reneging is not costly, identifying cost-
liness is not always easy.2 Attempts to address
related issues in the area of domestic monetary
policy appear in the “rules versus discretion”
literature, which considers alternative economic
scenarios and the likelihood of various govern-
ment reactions to them.
Although the issue of rules versus discretion
was developed without a focus on exchange rates
(Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon
1983a and 1983b), numerous authors have recently
applied this framework to questions about appro-
priate exchange rate regimes.3 In many such appli-
cations, surprise devaluations are assumed to
increase inflation, a result countries generally do
not want, and to increase output, a result coun-
tries almost universally want. Overall, when these
are the likely outcomes of devaluation, a fixed
exchange rate is not very credible unless authori-
ties despise inflation so much that they will avoid
devaluation at any cost.
The story became more complicated, how-
ever, when Edwards (1989) and Faini and de Melo
(1990) showed that developing countries often
suffer a fall in output growth from surprise devalua-
tions, a scenario first outlined for Latin America by
Diaz–Alejandro (1963).4 Thus, while the earlier litera-
ture tells us something about when fixed exchange
rates may be incredible, Edwards (1989) and Faini
and de Melo (1990) offer information about when
fixed exchange rates may prove credible.
Contractionary devaluations result from a
variety of sources.5 One involves the economic
structure generated in Latin America by its post-
World War II protectionist policies. Protected
domestic industries relied heavily on imported
inputs, especially capital goods. In addition, pro-
tection of industry rendered investment in agricul-
ture and other exporting sectors unprofitable.
Therefore, exporting sectors had a tendency to
stagnate. In these circumstances, devaluation can
have perverse effects on output. Devaluation
increases the price of investment goods, which
leads to a collapse of investment. Because Latin
American countries generally did not have capital
2 This article tries to treat credibility as endogenous, that is,
the credibility of a fixed exchange rate is dependent on the
costs of devaluing to society. We ignore the political pro-
cess. Credibility will also depend upon how effectively the
political process punishes policymakers and governments
for bad economic outcomes.
3 These include Kamin (1988), Giovannini (1990 and 1992),
Agénor (1991), Devarajan and Rodrik (1991), and Dorn-
busch and Fischer (1991).
4 See Diaz–Alejandro (1963) and Cooper (1971) for early
analyses of contractionary devaluation. More recent stud-
ies include Krugman and Taylor (1978), Lizondo and Montiel
(1986), Edwards (1989), Faini and de Melo (1990), and
Cooper (1992).
5 At best, devaluations tend to be neutral in Edwards’ analysis
(Edwards 1989, chapter 8). Output tends to fall before the
devaluation, usually as a result of a deterioration in the terms
of trade. When devaluation finally occurs, output tends to
improve but not necessarily to a level greater than or equal
to output before the terms of trade shock. Kamin (1988) also
comes to similar conclusions. McLeod and Welch (1992)
find a nonlinear relationship, where small (surprise) real
devaluations increase output growth and large devalua-
tions decrease it in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Ven-
ezuela, while any devaluation decreases output in Chile
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goods-producing sectors, and import substitution
policies left exporting sectors weak and inflexible,
the devaluation would not generate an expansion
of domestic capital goods production nor an off-
setting increase in export revenue to buy imported
capital goods. Economic stagnation would result,
if only temporarily.
These peculiar circumstances mean that, unlike
some countries in other parts of the world, Latin
American nations have avoided using exchange rate
policies to improve output growth. If anything,
Latin American governments have resisted devalu-
ation, even in the face of severe overvaluation.
(See the Appendix, “Inflation and Exchange Rates
in Latin America,” for a description of exchange
rate policies in Latin America). Indeed, in addition
to the economic costs of higher inflation and, in
some cases, lower output growth, Latin American
devaluations often entail political costs.6
Despite the negative economic and political
effects, Latin American countries have devalued.
Even in cases when fixed exchange rates have
been an explicit objective of policy, such credible
fixed exchange rates have not been part of Latin
America’s experience over the past thirty years.7
These difficulties not only raise questions
about the process of devaluation and exchange
rate manipulation, but also about the process of
credibility formation. Where devaluations are
known to weaken output growth and increase
inflation, special care must be taken in considering
the nature of policy trade-offs. Why, after all,
would governments want what many of their
citizens would regard as prejudicial?
One explanation that Kydland and Prescott
(1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a and 1983b), and
Dornbusch and Fischer (1991) suggest is that a
government might want to increase inflation tax
revenue through surprise inflation. In the case of
Latin America, this argument is not credible. Dorn-
busch and Fischer find that the pure public-finance
motive for inflation explains little in the context of
Latin American countries experiencing moderate
inflation, such as Brazil in the 1960s and Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico. Dornbusch, Sturzenegger,
and Wolf (1990) show that the public-finance
motive only marginally explains the acceleration
of inflation in the high-inflation Latin American
countries—Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil in the
1980s, and Peru.
Another argument, however, is credible.
Latin American countries have had to use nominal
exchange rate surprises to generate substantial
balance of payments (trade) surpluses to service
their foreign debts.8 Other factors suggest that the
generation of foreign exchange reserves is an
important consideration when a policymaker
contemplates the consequences of devaluation in
the context of debt-servicing difficulties. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1980) point out that foreign exchange
reserves take on special importance in providing
liquidity services for export and import transac-
tions, especially if the country faces credit limits in
international markets.9 Similarly, van Wijnbergen
(1990) emphasizes the insurance value of foreign
exchange reserves when trade-contingent debt
instruments do not exist in international capital
markets for these countries. For these reasons, we
introduce reserve growth as an objective of policy.
A model of the exchange rate credibility
problem in Latin America
We present a game to simulate the special
exchange rate credibility problems that a Latin
American policymaker might face. We then address
some of the issues the game raises for Latin America.
6 See Edwards (1989) and Edwards and Montiel (1989).
7 The most noteworthy cases are those of the Southern Cone
countries of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. These countries combined trade and
capital account liberalization with exchange rate pegging
to bring down inflation. All the programs had collapsed by
1982, due to severe terms of trade shocks, interest rate
shocks, and the fact that the fixed exchange rate did not
necessarily force the adoption of fiscal, monetary, and
financial policies consistent with fixed exchange rates.
8 See Faini and de Melo (1990) for a discussion of the central
role of real exchange rate depreciation in the stabilization
policies in the debt crisis of the 1980s.
9 To support this claim, Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) provide
evidence that debt and foreign reserves were asset substi-
tutes for less-developed countries in the 1970s. As these
countries borrowed internationally, reserve holdings fell.
Once voluntary lending dried up in the early 1980s, the
demand for reserves increased accordingly.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 34
Consistent with our discussion in the previous
section, the model introduces a balance of pay-
ments surplus target, the growth in foreign exchange
reserves, in the objective function so that the
trade-off in policy objectives is between inflation
and the growth in foreign reserves (a balance of
payments surplus).10
To present exchange rate credibility problems
as simply as possible, we assume that unantici-
pated depreciations of the currency improve the
balance of payments or, equivalently, increase
foreign exchange reserve growth. Equation 1
characterizes the forces that may affect growth or
the decline in reserves as11
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where R is the level of foreign reserves held by
the central bank, a (⋅) signifies a rate of change
over time, e is the rate of depreciations of the
nominal exchange rate, E is the expectations
operator, and  is an external shock that is equal,
on average, to zero. This shock could represent
unexpected changes in the terms of trade, defined
as the (foreign) price of exports over the (foreign)
price of imports, or changes in foreign interest
rates over some expected value. All variables are
expressed in natural logarithms.  measures the
(temporary) increase in reserve growth due to a
surprise devaluation per unit of (infinitesimal)
time; exchange rate depreciation can only in-
crease reserve growth if it is a surprise. The short-
term nature of the analysis assumes that the quan-
tum of exports and imports does not quickly
adjust to terms of trade or interest rate shocks and,
therefore, any such shock translates completely
into reserve changes. The expected external shock
is equal to zero.
All goods in this simple model are traded.
Inflation is determined purely by expectations of
inflation. We can assume that goods price arbitrage
(purchasing power parity) holds and that individuals
have rational expectations. The private sector,
however, sets its inflation expectations before the
government decides where to set changes in the
exchange rate and, thus, inflation.12 Individuals in
the private sector lose mainly through incorrect
predictions of the exchange rate, although, on
average, individuals correctly predict inflation.
Thus, we assume that individuals in the private





UE p =− − [] ππ
Accordingly, they try to forecast the inflation
rate as accurately as possible to minimize their
losses from miscalculation. Hence, individuals will
act so that
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where   is domestic inflation and  * is the foreign
inflation rate, set equal to zero for simplicity. In
the long run, expected values of all variables will
equal their actual values. But we assume the
government can react to shocks to the system
more quickly than the public because prices
(and wages) are set before the shock is revealed.
Therefore, the government can temporarily cause
departures from purchasing power parity by
unexpectedly changing the nominal exchange
rate.
The government minimizes a quadratic loss
function, which penalizes any inflation rate
(positive or negative) not equal to zero and
deviations from a target growth rate of foreign
reserves, R˙,












where –(R˙ – R˙*) measures the marginal utility of
a deviation of an increase in reserves. If reserve
10 Sachs (1985) analyzes the U.S. trade deficit in a similar way.
The relationship could also include the capital account. We
exclude the capital account for ease of exposition.
11 In a more complete model, the country produces nontraded
goods as well as traded goods, and the direct effects of
exchange rate changes are concentrated on the traded-
goods sector.
12 This timing could be generated by the overlapping con-
tracts framework of Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977), or it
could be due to the government having an informational
advantage, as in Canzoneri (1985). It is unlikely, however,
that the government will observe terms of trade shocks
before the private sector. The inertia in prices due to con-
tracting gives the government room to use surprise devalu-
ation to increase reserve growth, as discussed below.Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 35
growth is below its target rate, the marginal utility
is positive, and if reserve growth is above its
target rate, the marginal utility is negative.
The game proceeds in two simple stages.
The private sector sets its devaluation and, thus,
inflation expectations, and enters into contracts
based on these price expectations. The govern-
ment then sets its rate of devaluation. Table 1
presents the payoff matrix for the government and
private sectors, and Table 2 presents the analytical
solutions to the game under two conditions:
credible precommitment, in which the govern-
ment irrevocably fixes the exchange rate, and
flexible exchange rates, which are equivalent to
a noncredible fixed exchange rate.13
If the government cannot be forced to
honor a commitment to a fixed exchange rate,
the dominant strategy for the government is a
flexible rate.14 Knowing this, the private sector
will always expect exchange rates to be flexible.
Accordingly, the equilibrium will correspond to
the lower right quadrant of Table 1. On the other
hand, suppose the government precommits to a
fixed exchange rate and, through legislation or
membership in a currency bloc, the commitment
is credible. Then one possible equilibrium of the
game could correspond to the upper left quad-
rant of Table 1. The other equilibrium is still the
flexible exchange rate equilibrium in the lower
right quadrant of the table.
If “commitment technologies” exist that can
force the government to establish an irrevocably
fixed exchange rate, which regime will the
government pick? This game does not yield an
unambiguous choice.15 Both regimes have differ-
ent implications for inflation and reserve growth.
We now investigate these different outcomes.
Table 1
Payoff Matrix for the Government and Private Sectors Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates*
Private sector expects













where e = rate of devaluation, E = expectations operator, 2
 = E (2) is the variance of external shocks.
*The first value in the ordered pair represents the government’s payoff and the second the private sector’s payoff.
13 We assume that the targeted growth rate of reserves R ˙* and
shocks   are independent. In Table 2, the subscript r
denotes rule, while the subscript d denotes discretion.
14 To see this, compare the total payoff to the government
when e = 0 and when e > 0. The payoff when e > 0 is
unambiguously larger than when e = 0.
15 If we subtract the expression for E(U)d from E(U)r in Table
2, we find
































The sign of this expression depends on the government’s
marginal rate of substitution between inflation and interna-
tional reserves, ß (> 0), and the effects of devaluation on
reserve growth as well as the target level of reserve growth
and the variance of external shocks. The partial derivatives
of   are
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Inflation and reserve growth with
a credibly fixed exchange rate
Suppose the government can credibly commit
to the exchange rate rule that sets er=0. From
Table 2, the equilibrium exchange rate deprecia-
tion and inflation,  r, will be zero, and expected
reserve growth will be zero, while actual reserve
fluctuations will completely accommodate unex-
pected terms of trade or foreign interest rate
fluctuations.
Notice that the larger the government’s
desired reserve accumulation, the more govern-
ment welfare falls. A government that credibly
commits (forever) to a fixed exchange rate will be
continuously frustrated in increasing its stock of
reserves if this divergence persists. A higher
variance of the shock term also decreases welfare.
Such a policy, however, is not time consistent.
The government can improve on this outcome
temporarily by announcing a fixed exchange rate
and then devaluing.16 Rational individuals will
recognize the government’s incentive to renege on
its exchange rate stance and will set expectations
Table 2
Equilibrium Inflation, Reserve Growth, and Expected Government Utility
Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates
Credible precommitment Flexible exchange rate
to a fixed exchange rate (No credible commitment)
where  = inflation rate, e = rate of devaluation,  = terms of trade, E = expectations operator, U = government’s utility, 2
 = E (2)
is the variance of external shocks.
16 A government that convinces the public it will keep ex-
change rates fixed can improve welfare by cheating in the
current period. For an explanation, note that expected
inflation in the current period will be zero. Maximizing









Expected and actual reserve accumulation under cheating
will be
  ˙˙ .
* RR C =
Expected utility will be equal to zero, which is clearly an
improvement over credibly fixed exchange rates and, as we
shall see, flexible exchange rates since both generate
negative expected utility. Such a situation, however, is not
consistent. The public would recognize the government’s
large incentive to cheat, and the equilibrium outcome
reverts to the discretionary flexible exchange rate case
above. Also, once the public realizes that the government
has cheated, cheating can never be used again. Address-
ing sustainable equilibria over time and the relationship
between credibility and reputation are beyond the scope
of this article. For discussion and analysis, see Barro and
Gordon (1983a and 1983b), Rogoff (1985 and 1987),
Canzoneri (1985), Cukierman (1986), Agénor (1991),
Obstfeld (1991), and Fischer (1990).
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and prices so that the marginal cost of devaluing
will equal the marginal benefit to the government.
Inflation and reserve growth under
flexible exchange rates
Assuming that optimal reserve growth is posi-
tive, a government that can gain foreign exchange
reserves by devaluing will face the well-known
inflationary bias of policies that lack credibility.
The private sector, knowing that the govern-
ment has an incentive to devalue to raise reserve
growth, expects a devaluation. The private sector
will set prices accordingly, generating positive
inflation regardless of the government’s policy
stance. Even if the government does not devalue
when the private sector expects a devaluation,
the economy will suffer from high inflation. The
positive rate of inflation, combined with the fixed
exchange rate, will cause a surge in imports and
a fall in exports, culminating in a loss in foreign
reserves. Following a no-devaluation policy with-
out credibility is doubly costly to the government:
both inflation and a balance of payments crisis
will result. The government will devalue, one
way or another.
Formally, one can see this result by taking
expectations on the equilibrium solution for
devaluation and inflation under flexible exchange
rates and noting that the ex ante expected shock
is zero. Then from Table 2, expected inflation and
devaluation is
() ( ) ( ) ˙ .
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It should be noted that the adjustment
programs undertaken in Latin America included
devaluation for the explicit purpose of increasing
foreign exchange reserves. The analysis suggests
that this policy will be inherently inflationary. On
the other hand, governments may intend to fix
exchange rates forever but cannot resist the temp-
tation to devalue to increase reserves. Economic
agents, recognizing this, act to protect themselves
from the devaluation by increasing the rate of
price increases.
Because the coefficient on the shock term
in the solution for reserves under flexible exchange
rates in Table 2 is less than the corresponding
coefficient under fixed exchange rates, the flexible
rate regime can smooth fluctuations in foreign
exchange reserves due to unexpected changes in
the terms of trade or foreign interest rates. Again,
as in the credible fixed exchange rate case, the
government cannot affect the expected (aver-
age) rate of foreign reserve accumulation in the
long run.
To fix or not to fix? The importance
of output effects of real devaluation
A comparison of the game’s outcomes under
the two regimes suggests that a credible commit-
ment to a fixed exchange rate regime eliminates
the inflationary bias of the flexible rate regime.
Unfortunately, however, this policy increases the
economy’s susceptibility to external shocks. The
choice of regime, therefore, depends on the relative
importance a particular government places on
each of these two objectives and on how sensitive
the balance of payments is to exchange rate sur-
prises. Whether a country fixes its exchange rate
depends on how heavily the policymaker values
reserves relative to inflation (), how sensitive
reserve growth is to devaluation (), the variance
of external shocks  2
, and the target reserve
growth R˙*.
Before the early 1980s, Latin American
countries grew significantly. The terms of trade
and international interest rates remained fairly
steady. Most Latin American countries maintained
fixed exchange rates throughout this period,
despite the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s.
The external trauma of the late 1970s and early
1980s brought increases in world interest rates
and a major decline in the terms of trade to most
of Latin America. The model predicts that an
increase in the variance of foreign shocks will
increase the desirability of a more flexible rate,
and, in fact, many Latin American countries
moved toward a more flexible rate.
In the early 1990s, adjustment to these
shocks is nearly complete for most Latin American
countries, and interest rates and terms of trade are
stable. The theory presented above suggests that
Latin American countries will tend toward fixed
exchange rates in the near future, barring any
major disruption of international trade and capital
flows.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 38
Costs and benefits of fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes
Most Latin American countries had to devalue
their exchange rates dramatically in the 1980s in
the face of the balance of payments problems
brought about by the debt crisis and adverse terms
of trade movements. The adjustment under more
flexible exchange rates imposed high economic
costs. Most Latin American countries suffered
large declines in gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita in the first half of the decade. From
1981 to 1985, the cumulative fall in per capita
GDP was 12.6 percent in Argentina, 14.9 percent
in Chile, 8.7 percent in Mexico, and 14.5 percent
in Venezuela.17 Brazil and Colombia managed to
increase GDP per capita by 4.1 percent and 1.9
percent, respectively, after suffering initial con-
tractions between 1981 and 1984. Inflation, as
discussed in the Appendix, also accelerated in all
six of these countries in the first half of the 1980s.
The costs of balance of payments crises were
high, especially in those countries where output
fell as a consequence of real devaluation.
Latin American terms of trade movements
settled down in the 1980s, and international
interest rates have declined significantly in recent
years. Given these results, we are not surprised to
see countries such as Argentina and Mexico return-
ing to fixed exchange rates after more than a
decade of adjustment to the debt crisis. Enhanced
credibility should greatly improve these countries’
macroeconomic performances, barring any new
balance of payments crisis. The costs of renewed
real devaluation emanating from large government
deficits and excessive money growth in the form
of high inflation and losses of foreign reserves
should temper any moves back to macroeconomic
mismanagement. Terms of trade shocks, however,
can still undo these fixed exchange rates and,
thus, keep the exchange rate regimes from being
completely credible. Consequently, some flexibil-
ity in the exchange rates in Latin America may be
desirable.
Ultimately, however, the credibility of
government policy will depend on its prolonged
effort to maintain monetary and fiscal discipline
for low inflation and, more generally, to keep the
reform process on track. Latin American countries
seem, at least for the moment, to be headed in
this direction.
17 Inter-American Development Bank (1991).Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 39
Appendix
Inflation and Exchange Rates in Latin America
temporarily, to pegged exchange rates.
Figures 1 through 6 show trends for
these six countries.1,2 The figures also show
For most of the period since World War
II, Latin American countries have generally
maintained fixed exchange rates with the
U.S. dollar. These fixed exchange rate re-
gimes usually collapsed, but Latin American
central banks most often returned to a fixed
exchange rate following devaluation.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Venezuela tried to maintain pari-
ties fixed to the dollar until the late 1960s.
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela were more
successful than Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,
even in the face of high inflation and over-
valuation. The ultimate devaluations, how-
ever, were followed by a return, if only (Continued on the next page)
1 Descriptions of exchange rate policies in each of these coun-
tries can be found in Cavallo and Cottani (1991) for Argentina,
Coes (1991) for Brazil, Edwards and Edwards (1987) and de la
Cuadra and Hachette (1991) for Chile, Edwards (1986) and
Garcia Garcia (1991) for Colombia,  Ortiz (1991), and McLeod
and Welch (1991) for Mexico.
2 Inflation (upper charts in Figures 1 through 6) is measured as
the logarithmic percentage change in the consumer price index
(CPI), with data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Nominal exchange rates are taken from the IMF’s RF series.
The lower charts in Figures 1 through 6 show (three-year
moving average) standard deviations of logarithmic changes in
the terms of trade, with data from the World Bank (1991).
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Inflation and Exchange Rates in Latin America—Continued
Figure 3
Trends in Chile
tina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, while
Brazil and Colombia had to accelerate their
exchange rates’ devaluation rate. After these
large devaluations, Argentina and Chile
followed crawling pegs until 1978. In 1979,
Argentina and Chile, along with Uruguay, tried
to use their exchange rates to lower inflation
by slowly decreasing the rate of crawl to zero.
Rising international interest rates in the
late 1970s and severe terms of trade shocks
in the early 1980s caused all six countries to
abandon fixed rate regimes and adopt more
flexible exchange rates. They continuously
devalued their currencies. Each of these coun-
tries had to increase its exports and decrease
Figure 4
Trends in Colombia
that inflation rates and changes in exchange
rates tend to be highest when the variability of
the terms of trade is high for most of these
countries.
The figures reflect Brazil’s and Colom-
bia’s moves to crawling pegs in the late 1960s.
Argentina briefly used a crawling peg from
1964 to 1966 and during 1971. Argentina,
however, reverted to imposing fixed exchange
rate regimes throughout the postwar period.
Chile, on the other hand, seems to have
implicitly used a crawling peg arrangement
until fixing in 1971, although officially the
country had fixed rates.
Economic disturbances in the early
1970s, especially OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo,
caused a new set of devaluations in Argen- (Continued on the next page)



















Nominal Exchange Rate Change (RF)
Inflation Rate (CPI)






Nominal Exchange Rate Change (RF)
Inflation Rate (CPI)
Standard deviation of changes in terms of trade
(Percent)
Inflation rate and nominal exchange rate
(Percent)
Standard deviation of changes in terms of trade
(Percent)
Inflation rate and nominal exchange rate
(Percent)Economic Review — First Quarter 1993 41





its imports to service the large foreign debts it
had accumulated in the 1970s. During this
period of flexible exchange rates in the mid-
1980s, inflation accelerated to unprecedented
levels in all Latin America, with the exception
of Chile.
Flexible exchange rate regimes lasted
until the late 1980s, except for brief periods of
fixed exchange rates in Argentina (1985–87)
and Brazil (1986–87) during their failed so-
called “heterodox” inflation stabilization plans,
which used wage and price controls. In 1988,
Mexico initiated a successful anti-inflation pro-
gram designed to keep exchange rate depre-
ciation slower than the inflation rate. (By late
1991, the Mexican peso’s exchange rate was
virtually fixed.) Argentina followed Mexico in
early 1991 by fixing the Argentine exchange
rate to the U.S. dollar and promising full con-
vertibility of Argentine australs (now pesos)
into dollars.
These most recent fixed exchange rate
policies represent governments’ use of ex-
change rates to signal the governments’ in-
tentions concerning future inflation and to
increase the credibility of anti-inflation pro-
grams. Such exchange rate pegs are never
fully credible because governments have an
incentive to devalue and inflate once the
public formulates inflation expectations. Some
countries, especially Chile and Argentina,
have enacted constraints to eliminate the
governments’ ability to renege on announced
policy rules.
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